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This Note argues that the international community should relax prohibitions against unilat-
eral humanitarian action until the international collective security measures of the U.N. Charter
designed to prevent egregious human rights abuses are effective. Because modern technology has
significantly increased the ability to discern pretextual actions from altruistic actions, the potential
abuse of unilateral humanitarian intervention is minimized. While the meaning of the word “in-
tervention” in itself is subject to debate, this Note will consider only military intervention. Part
I of this Note discusses the historical background of humanitarian intervention. Part II first ana-
lyzes the arguments against legalization of humanitarian intervention, based on the U.N. Charter
and state practice. Part II then analyzes the arguments for legalization and explains how the U.N.
Charter and state practice can be read to mandate legality. Part III argues that the legalization of
unilateral humanitarian intervention, within limits, would not create incentives for the doctrine’s
massive abuse as was once feared. This Note concludes that the legalization of limited unilateral
humanitarian intervention would effectively balance human rights and legitimate state sovereignty,
while maintaining international stability.
NOTE
UNILATERAL HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION:




One of the foremost principles in international law is the
inviolability of the territorial sovereignty of individual states.'
Territorial sovereignty derives from the theory of the state,
whereby the existing government is supreme within its terri-
tory, and no external force may interfere with that supremacy.2
The state can exert its influence in any manner over all persons
and property within its boundaries.3 Under international law,
other states must respect this territorial sovereignty.4 When a
state perpetrates human rights abuses against its citizens, how-
ever, another state may violate the state's territorial sover-
eignty and protect the abused citizens under the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention. 5
Since the inception of the U.N. Charter (the "Charter"),
1. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 276 (3d ed. 1991). State govern-
ments are traditionally free to act without restraint within their borders. Id. "Inter-
national law is based on the concept of the state. The state in its turn lies upon the
foundation of sovereignty, which expresses internally the supremacy of the govern-
mental institutions and externally the supremacy of the state as a legal person." Id.
2. Id. at 276-77.
3. J.G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 152 (9th ed. 1984).
4. BELATCHEW AsRAT, PROHIBITION OF FORCE UNDER THE U.N. CHARTER 148-49
(1991) (stating that "[o]ther States have the correlative duty of respecting this base of
State authority, which is one of the important elements constituting statehood").
The United Nations codified this principle in article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter, which
states that "[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any state." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 7.
5. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 312 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955).
Humanitarian intervention is traditionally defined as an action to prevent a foreign
state from denying fundamental rights and persecuting its own citizens in a way
which "shock[s] the conscience of mankind." Id. Authors generally accept this basic
definition although some find that "the doctrine [of humanitarian intervention] [i]s
inherently vague." IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY
STATES 338 (1963) [hereinafter BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW]; see Thomas M.
Franck & Nigel S. Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by
Military Force, 67 AM.J. INT'L L. 275, 305 (1973) (concluding that "a usable general
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
humanitarian intervention has been considered illegal,'
although the Charter does not explicitly ban it.7 Despite this
definition of 'humanitarian intervention' would be extremely difficult to formulate
and virtually impossible to apply rigorously").
Humanitarian intervention has also been defined as "the proportionate trans-
boundary help, including forcible help, provided by governments to individuals in
another state who are being denied basic human rights and who themselves would be
rationally willing to revolt against their oppressive government." FERNANDO TES6N,
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY 5 (1988) (em-
phasis omitted).
The protection of a state's own nationals abroad has also come under the rubric
of humanitarian intervention. See, e.g., Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, Forcible Self-Help by
States to Protect Human Rights: Recent Views from the United Nations, in HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 197, 198-99 (Richard B. Lillich, ed. 1973).
The U.S. interventions in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and in Grenada in 1983,
and the Israeli raid on Entebbe in 1976, are examples of such interventions. See
Thomas E. Behuniak, The Law of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention by Armed Force: A
Legal Survey, 79 MIL. L. REV. 157, 172-74 (1978) (for Dominican Republic and En-
tebbe incidences); Michael J. Bazylar, Reexamining the Doctrine of Humanitarian Interven-
tion in Light of the Atrocities in Kampuchea and Ethiopia, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 547, 586
(1987) (for Grenada incident). This Note, however, will discuss only the protection
of citizens facing abuses at the hands of their own government. For a review of the
protection of one's own nationals abroad, see NATALINO RONZrrrI, RESCUING NATION-
ALS ABROAD THROUGH MILITARY COERCION AND INTERVENTION ON GROUNDS OF Hu-
MANITY (1985).
6. See, e.g., Paul Lewis, The Right to Intervene for a Humanitarian Cause, N.Y. TIMES,
July 12, 1992, § 4 (Week in Review), at 22. The doctrine of humanitarian interven-
tion presently is receiving widespread attention due to the end of the cold war and
the hope that the United Nations might finally act in the fashion it was designed. Id.
Before the collapse of the Soviet Union as a rival superpower to the United States,
"[c]old war tensions virtually assured paralysis, with the rival superpowers fearing
that humanitarian intervention would be directed against their interests .... But
with the cold war over, Western governments and humanitarian organizations began
pressing for new action to defend vulnerable people." Id. Since 1987, some U.N.
organizations have tried to establish humanitarian intervention as a right under inter-
national law. Id. There is evidence, however, that the United Nations is
overburdened by the present crises occurring around the globe and cannot possibly
contain every crisis. See, e.g., Too Much Stress at the U.N., N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1992, at
A20. "The crisis switchboard at the United Nations is overloaded. Once paralyzed
by cold war rivalries, the world organization is nowadays asked to do too much: en-
force peace in Sarajevo, face down a truculent Saddam Hussein and clean up messes
in Cambodia, Central America, Afghanistan and South America." Id.
7. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4; see Ian Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, in LAw
AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 217 (John N. Moore ed., 1974) [hereinafter
Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention]. Those authors who argue that humanitarian in-
tervention should be illegal include Ian Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, supra;
Vladimir Kartashkin, Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention, in LAw AND FORCE IN
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 202 (Lori F. Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds.,
1991); RONzITrI, supra note 5; Franck & Rodley, supra note 5; Farrokh Jhabvala, Uni-
lateral Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, 21 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 208 (1981);
Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620 (1984);
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putative illegality, however, the debate concerning whether hu-
manitarian intervention is illegal or legal has continued with
many supporters on both sides. The commentators who sup-
port the ban on humanitarian intervention argue that if hu-
manitarian intervention were legal, the cost of the potential
abuse of pretextual interventions would outweigh any benefit
derived from altruistic interventions.8 A pretextual interven-
tion is a nation's use of military force in a different state for the
nation's own gain, not for the protection of human rights.9 An
altruistic intervention, however, occurs when a nation's mo-
tives for military intervention are grounded predominantly in
the protection of human rights.'" Furthermore, these com-
mentators stress that the Charter provides for collective secur-
ity measures that sufficiently protect human rights."
Many commentators, however, advocate the legalization
of humanitarian intervention.' 2  These commentators argue
that the past 13 and present' 4 failures of the Charter's collective
W.D. Verwey, Humanitarian Intervention Under International Law, 32 NETHERLANDS INT'L
L. REV. 357 (1985). But see infra note 12 (listing authors who believe humanitarian
intervention should be legal).
8. See, e.g., BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 5.
9. See, e.g., Schachter, supra note 7, at 1629.
10. Id.
11. U.N. CHARTER ch. VII. Article 39, which begins chapter VII, states that
"[t]he Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide
what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or
restore international peace and security." U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
12. Richard B. Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea
for Constructive Alternatives, in LAw AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 229 (John
N. Moore ed., 1974) [hereinafter Lillich, A Reply]. The authors who support the le-
gality of humanitarian intervention include TEs6N, supra note 5; Michael J. Bazylar,
Reexamining the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of the Atrocities in Kampuchea
and Ethiopia, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 547 (1987); Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, The Customary
International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity Under the U.N.
Charter, 4 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 203 (1973); Michael J. Levitin, The Law of Force and the
Force of Law: Grenada, the Falklands, and Humanitarian Intervention, 27 HARV. INT'L LJ.
621 (1986); Richard B. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help By States To Protect Human Rights, 53
IOWA L. REV. 325 (1967) [hereinafter Lillich, Self-Help]; W. Michael Reisman, Coercion
and Self-Determination: Construing Charter Article 2(4), 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 642 (1984); R.
George Wright, A Contemporary Theory of Humanitarian Intervention, 4 FLA. INT'L L.J. 435
(1989). But see supra note 7 (listing some authors who argue that humanitarian inter-
vention should be illegal).
13. See Fonteyne, supra note 12, at 237. It is clear that the collective security
measures of the Charter have often failed to prevent serious abuses. See id. Sadly, it
is often
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security provisions to prevent egregious human rights abuses
clearly mandate the legalization of humanitarian interven-
tion.' 5 For example, in current ethnic fighting in the former
Yugoslavia, Serbians are engaging in an "ethnic cleansing"
campaign to drive out all Muslims and Croats from various ar-
eas in Bosnia and Herzegovina. t6 Moreover, reports from the
area describe Serbians moving Croatian and Muslim refugees
into concentration camps, evoking images of the Nazis' camps
in World War II, where people are killed, beaten, and
starved. 17 In Somalia, during nationwide drought and famine,
warring factions engaged in a civil war have pushed farmers off
their land so that the farmers are unable to plant their crops.
It is estimated that one-third of Somalia's population may die
without humanitarian relief,'8 and more than 100,000 people
have already died.' 9 In the Sudan, a push by the government
to spread Islam throughout the country has led to rebellion
and civil war. 20 The war has already taken the lives of over
500,000 Sudanese, from both famine and warfare. 2' In Iraq,
Kurds have discovered mass graves, torture chambers, and
elaborate prison systems that document the egregious human
those extreme cases where the most fundamental human rights are mas-
sively threatened, that the United Nations and the regional organizations,
paralyzed by Major Power disagreements and the reluctance of the New
States to accept any infringement upon the sacrosanct principles of sover-
eign independence and nonintervention in a setting lacking colonial and
para-colonial aspects, have been unable or unwilling to take any significant
measures .... Biafra, Indonesia, Sudan, Burundi, Bangladesh, and more
recently, Uganda are but the most recent bloody examples of the unfortu-
nate passivity and ineffectiveness of the international organizations.
Id. (citations omitted).
14. See, e.g., Patrick E. Tyler, U.N. Chief's Dispute With Council Boils Over, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 3, 1992, at Al.
15. See, e.g., Lillich, A Reply, supra note 12.
16. See John F. Burns, Serbs' Campaign for Ethnic Purity Divides Up a Busload of Or-
phans, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1992, at Al.
17. See Stephen Engelberg, Bosnians Provide Accounts Of Abuse in Serbian Camps,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1992, at Al.
18. See Jane Perlez, Deaths in Somalia Outpace Delivery of Food, N.Y. TIMES, July 19,
1992, at AI.
19. See Jeffrey Bartholet, The Road to Hell, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 21, 1992, at 52. The
United Nations belatedly has begun to send in troops to protect the relief supplies
reaching Somalia. Id. at 53. Looting, by armed gunmen, of previous supplies des-
tined for those in need prevented proper distribution. Id.
20. See Chris Hedges, Sudan's Strife Promises to Outlive Rebellion, N.Y. TIMES, July
19, 1992, § 4 (Week in Review), at 3.
21. Id.
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rights violations perpetrated by Iraqi President Saddam Hus-
sein's government.22
Commentators support their arguments for or against the
legality of humanitarian intervention through interpretation of
the U.N. Charter and state practice.2 3 When interpreting the
U.N. Charter, scholars incorporate the many resolutions that
the United Nations has passed since 1945 both supporting24
and not supporting 5 the legalization of humanitarian inter-
vention. Commentators both for and against the legalization
of humanitarian intervention find support for their arguments
in the "state practice" doctrine, 26 whereby nations' actions le-
22. Chris Hedges, Kurds Unearthing New Evidence of Iraqi Killings, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
7, 1991, at Al.
23. See, e.g., TES6N, supra note 5, at 129.
24. Id. at 128-29; see, e.g. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46,
at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/830 (1979) (declaring equality of women and men); Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 12,
1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (seeking to end government sponsored practice of racial
discrimination); International Conference on Human Rights (the "Proclamation of Tehe-
ran"), 1968 U.N.Y.B. 538, 539 (declaring that economic development cannot come
about without protection of human rights); International Covenant on Economic, So-
cial and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 21st Sess., 1496th
plen. mtg. at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (recognizing the right to self-determina-
tion as a fundamental right); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, Jan. 12, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (outlawing all practices which
intend to destroy a specific national, ethnic, racial or religious group); Universal Decla-
ration on Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, 3(1), U.N. GAOR Res. 71, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948) (calling on all states to recognize and affirm general human rights for all peo-
ples without limitation). For an overview of the U.N. responses to the protection of
human rights, see Louis B. SOHN & THOMAS B. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PRO-
TECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1973).
25. See, e.g., The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Re-
lations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970), reprinted in 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 243 (1971). This document states that "[n]o
state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any rea-
son whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state." 65 AM.J. Iwr'L L.
at 248; The 1974 U.N. Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess.,
Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974), reprinted in 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 480
(1975). This document defines "aggression" as "the use of armed force by a State
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another
State," id. art. 1, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. at 481, and then goes on to state that "[n]o
consideration of whatever nature, whether political, economic, military or otherwise,
may serve as a justification for aggression." Id. art. 5(1), 69 AM. J. INT'L L. at 482.
26. See infra notes 113-27 and accompanying text (discussing authors' views on
how "state practice" does not support the legality of humanitarian intervention); see
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gitimize similar actions taken in the future by other nations. 7
The International Court of Justice has not directly addressed
the issue of humanitarian intervention. 28
This Note argues that the international community should
relax prohibitions against unilateral humanitarian action until
the international collective security measures of the U.N. Char-
ter designed to prevent egregious human rights abuses are ef-
fective. Because modern technology has significantly in-
creased the ability to discern pretextual actions from altruistic
actions, the potential abuse of unilateral humanitarian inter-
vention is minimized. 29 While the meaning of the word "inter-
vention" in itself is subject to debate, this Note will consider
only military intervention.3 ° Part I of this Note discusses the
historical background of humanitarian intervention. Part II
first analyzes the arguments against legalization of humanita-
rian intervention, based on the U.N. Charter and state practice.
Part II then analyzes the arguments for legalization and ex-
plains how the U.N. Charter and state practice can be read to
mandate legality. Part III argues that the legalization of unilat-
eral humanitarian intervention, within limits, would not create
infra notes 153-61 and accompanying text (discussing authors' views on how "state
practice" supports the legality of humanitarian intervention).
27. See infra notes 65-95 and accompanying text (discussing definition and ex-
ample of "state practice").
28. Although the International Court of Justice has not directly addressed the
issue of humanitarian intervention, certain decisions do reflect, to some degree, on
the value of human rights and humanitarian intervention. These decisions are incon-
clusive as to the legality of the doctrine. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 4 (june 27); United States
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24); Legal
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971
I.CJ. 16 (June 21); Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v.
Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5) (second phase); South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Li-
ber. v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.C.J. 6 (July 18) (second phase); Reservations to the Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15
(May 28). For a review of the above cases, see Nigel S. Rodley, Human Rights and
Humanitarian Intervention: The Case Law of the World Court, 38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 321
(1989).
29. See infra notes 165-76 (discussing how technology can overcome inability to
discern true events in other states).
30. Verwey, supra note 7, at 364 (quotingJ.L. BRIERLY, THE LAw oF NATIONs 402
(1963)). Intervention can refer to "almost any acts of interference by one State in the
affairs of another." Id. For a discussion of the definitions of "intervention" and "hu-
manitarian intervention" see Verwey, supra note 7.
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incentives for the doctrine's massive abuse as was once feared.
This Note concludes that the legalization of limited unilateral
humanitarian intervention would effectively balance human
rights and legitimate state sovereignty, while maintaining in-
ternational stability.
I. THE HISTORY OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION:
LEGAL UNTIL THE U.N. CHARTER
Humanitarian intervention is difficult to define with preci-
sion.3 ' Most authors, though, adhere to a traditional defini-
tion, defining humanitarian intervention as an action to pre-
vent a state's denial of fundamental rights to, and persecution
of, its own citizens in a way that "shock[s] the conscience of
mankind."' s2 The theory of humanitarian intervention has un-
dergone various stages of development. In the 17th century,
Hugo Grotius first expounded a theory of humanitarian inter-
vention.33 He believed that while rulers ordinarily could deal
with their citizenry unimpeded, when the ruler terribly abused
the citizens, others have a right to try to prevent the mistreat-
ment.34 In the latter half of the 19th and early 20th centuries,
humanitarian intervention became widely accepted as almost
an absolute right of a state.35 The U.N. Charter, though, out-
lawed all resort to military force, including humanitarian inter-
vention.3 6 Identification of the factors which legitimize state
practice subsequent to the ratification of the Charter is difficult
because interpretations of the same events vary considerably
and arguments have been made supporting both the illegality
and the legality of humanitarian intervention.
31. See BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 5 and accompanying text;
Franck & Rodley, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
32. OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, at 312; see supra note 5 (discussing various defini-
tions of humanitarian intervention).
33. HUGO GROTIUS, DEJURE BELLI ESTI PACis 288 (Whewell trans., 1853).
34. Id.
35. Fonteyne, supra note 12, at 235.
36. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4. Article 2(4) of the Charter provides that "all Mem-
bers shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." See generally BROWN-
LIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 5.
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
A. Grotius: The Origin of Humanitarian Intervention
Early recognition of the doctrine of humanitarian inter-
vention is widely attributed to the works of the 17th century
Dutch author Hugo Grotius, 7 who is often called the "father
of international law." 38 Grotius propounded a theory that
when tyrants mistreat their subjects, and the subjects cannot
defend themselves, others outside the state may take action to
defend those oppressed subjects. 39 The theory flowed from a
presumption that while citizens had no legal right to take up
arms against their government, 40 nothing prevented others
from using force against the oppressive government for the
benefit of those citizens.4 '
Grotius employed a theory analogous to modern agency
theory, whereby an action is illegal because the individual lacks
standing to assert a legal right.42 An example of such an
agency theory is illustrated in the guardian/minor relationship:
the minor cannot legally contract or sue, but the minor's
guardian can contract or sue on the minor's behalf.43 There-
fore, although the oppressed citizens (the minor) could not at-
tack the government, a different sovereign (the guardian)
could do so for the oppressed citizens. Thus, Grotius believed
that in certain instances, humanitarian intervention was per-
37. OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, at 312. "Humanitarian intervention derives from
the teachings of Grotius." J.D. van der Vyver, Statehood in International Law, 5 EMORY
INT'L L. REV. 9, 76 n.323 (1991).
38. RICHARD FALK ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 7
(1985).
39. GROTIUS, supra note 33, at 288. "If a tyrant ... practises atrocities towards
his subjects, which no just man can approve, the right of human social connexion is
not cut off in such a case .... [I]t would not follow that others may not take up arms
for them." Id.
40. Id. Originally it was believed that despite any governmental action, citizens
had no authority to seek to overthrow the existing government. Id. Grotius doubted
this theory. Id.
41. Id. "[I]f we should grant that subjects cannot rightly take up arms even in
extreme necessity, (which, we have seen, has been doubted even by those whose pur-
pose was to defend the royal power,) it would not follow that others may not take up
arms for them." Id.
42. Id. "For when the impediment which exists to an action is in the person, not
in the thing itself; in such cases, what is not lawful to one person may be lawful to
another for him, if it be a case in which one can help another." Id.
43. Id. "Thus for a ward or minor, who is not capable of legal acts, the guardian
or trustee sustains the suit; and for an absent person, an agent even without a special
commission." Id.
1992-1993]
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missible."
Grotius did recognize that possible abuses could occur if
humanitarian intervention were legal.45 He argued, though,
that states could invoke any doctrine to use force as a mere
pretext for that use of force.46 Thus, he concluded that the
possible abuses do not necessitate the illegality of humanita-
rian intervention.4 7
B. The Pre-Charter Era: Humanitarian Intervention Was Legal
The doctrine of humanitarian intervention following Gro-
tius was largely a theoretical argument.48 Specific invocation
of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention by an intervening
state arose mostly in the latter half of the 19th century. 49 How-
ever, the first example of state practice when the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention was used to justify military force oc-
curred in 1829, when France, Britain, and Russia militarily en-
forced the 1827 Treaty of London in order to prevent massive
bloodshed in Greece, then under Ottoman occupation.50
France intervened militarily in Syria in 1860 to protect the
Christian population from slaughter at the hands of the Otto-
man empire.51 The French intervention is considered a valid
precedent for legalizing humanitarian intervention even by
those opposed to it. 2
44. Id.
45. Id. "[Tihe desire to appropriate another's possessions often uses such a
pretext as this: but that which is used by bad men does not necessarily therefore
cease to be right. Pirates use navigation, but navigation is not therefore unlawful.
Robbers use weapons, but weapons are not therefore unlawful." Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Fonteyne, supra note 12, at 214; Bazylar, supra note 12, at 571-72.
49. Fonteyne, supra note 12, at 206. " [I]t seems that the institution of humanita-
rian intervention is in fact largely a creation of the latter part of the 19th century.
This is certainly true so far as State practice explicitly referring to this justification is
concerned." Id.
50. Thomas E. Behuniak, The Law of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention by Armed
Force: A Legal Survey, 79 MIL. L. REV. 157, 160 (1978) (citing M. GANJI, PROTECTION
OF HUMAN Riirers (1962)). "[I]n the 1827 Treaty of London the Major Powers them-
selves indicated that their action was dictated 'no less by sentiments of humanity,
than by interests for the tranquility of Europe;' thus invoking, for the first time in
history, humanitarian concern as a justification for intervention." Fonteyne, supra
note 12, at 208 n.15 (citing GANJI, supra).
51. See generally RONZITrT, supra note 5, at 90 n.19.
52. See, e.g., BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 5, at 339-40.
1992-1993] HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
Another relevant example of state practice during this era
occurred in 1912, when Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia inter-
vened in Macedonia to end mistreatment of Christians, also by
the Ottoman empire.5 3 These and other state practices54 led
some authors to conclude that prior to the drafting of the U.N.
Charter, customary international law, through state practice
and in the opinion of leading scholars, unquestionably recog-
nized the legality of humanitarian intervention.55
C. The U.N. Charter's Effect on Humanitarian Intervention
The U.N. Charter fundamentally changed international
law by outlawing almost all unilateral resort to the use of
53. See generally RoNzrrr, supra note 5, at 91.
54. See generally Behuniak, supra note 50, at 161-62. The other examples of hu-
manitarian intervention during this period include the intervention in the island of
Crete (1866-68) and the intervention in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria (1876-
78). Id. Some authors proffer that these are valid precedents for the legality of hu-
manitarian intervention while others believe that these examples are of doubtful sig-
nificance, for a variety of reasons, to support its legality. Compare Fonteyne, supra
note 12 with BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 5, at 339-41 and RONZrnrI,
supra note 5, at 90-91.
55. Fonteyne, supra note 12, at 235. Professor Fonteyne's in-depth analysis of
the pre-World War II writings and state practices of humanitarian intervention led
him to conclude that humanitarian intervention was legal before the U.N. Charter.
Id.
[W]hile divergences certainly existed as to the circumstances in which resort
could be had to the institution of humanitarian intervention, as well as to the
manner in which such operations were to be conducted, the principle itself was
widely, if not unanimously, accepted as an integral part of customary inter-
national law.
Id. He further noted that the examples of humanitarian intervention are admittedly
few, but that there is no absolute number at which an action is accepted as legalized
by state practice. Id. at 232-33. Also, due to the lack of structure in international law,
leading scholars' and authors' opinions should be given significant weight. Id.
It is conceded that the precedents are not particularly numerous, but the
extent of State practice necessary to create a rule of customary international
law is a debatable question. That they are actually so scarce should not
come as a surprise .... In addition .... [tihe opinions of the leading schol-
ars, especially in an essentially non-institutionalized structure such as that of
international law, have a significant impact upon the development of the
legal norms of the system ....
Id. See Behuniak, supra note 50, at 166 (citing Mandelstam, The Protection of Minorities,
I. RECUEIL DES COURs 367, 391 (1923)) ("By the turn of the 20th Century, the princi-
ple of unilateral armed humanitarian intervention had won wide acceptance over the
rigid doctrine of nonintervention."); Richard B. Lillich, Intervention to Protect Human
Rights, 15 McGILL L.J. 205, 210 (1969) (stating that doctrine was "so clearly estab-
lished under customary international law that only its limits and not its existence is
subject to debate").
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force.56 Unilateral humanitarian intervention became illegal
under the Charter because Article 2(4) 57 banned all uses of
military force, except actions taken in self-defense 58 and ac-
tions authorized by the Security Council. 59 The United Na-
tions recognizes state sovereignty, and the Security Council
preserves peace, security, and human rights through collective
security.60
The legislative history of the Charter shows an intent by
the drafters to render illegal all excuses for resorting to mili-
tary force, except those explicitly stated in the Charter.6' This
legislative intent is generally understood to forbid self-help
and military reprisals.62 Article 2(4)'s ban on all force thus
covers unilateral humanitarian intervention.63 The provisions
outlawing all resort to military force except when approved by
the Security Council are considered the most important provi-
sions of the Charter and have been unanimously reaffirmed
numerous times.64 Therefore, the prevailing view finds that
the underlying purposes, as well as the express provisions of
the Charter, render unilateral humanitarian intervention ille-
gal.
56. Fonteyne, supra note 12, at 243-44. The Charter is "completely divorced
from the pre-existing body of rules under customary international law." Id.
57. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, $ 4. Article 2(4) of the Charter provides that "[a]ll
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." Id.
58. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. Article 51 of the Charter provides that "[n]othing in
the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations." Id.
59. U.N. CHARTER ch. VII. Chapter VII of the Charter, see supra note 11,
reserves to the Security Council the right to use military force against an aggressor.
See, e.g., Schachter, supra note 7.
60. Schachter, supra note 7, at 1620; BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note
5, at 333-34. "Chapter VII [of the Charter] conferred on the Security Council a
broad competence to act on behalf of the international community with respect to
varying characterizations of unlawful unilateral resorts to force: threats to the peace,
breaches of the peace and acts of aggression." Reisman, supra note 12, at 642.
61. See, e.g., BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 5, at 264-72.
62. Id. at 265.
63. Verwey, supra note 7, at 377. The Charter bans the "use of force for any
particular purpose, including a humanitarian one." Id.
64. Schachter, supra note 7, at 1620.
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D. State Practice
Before international rule-making bodies such as the
United Nations developed, international law consisted mainly
of customary rules.65 These customary rules derive from ac-
tions by states, called "state practice."' 66 Over time, "state
practice" becomes the norm and thus, legitimate. 67 When in-
terpreting a chain of state practices, however, it is sometimes
difficult to discern the true motives behind the state's action.
Discerning these underlying motives is important because they
determine the legitimacy of state practice, and thus legal action
in the international community.6
The Indian intervention in East Pakistan in 1971 ("the In-
dia case") is a classic example of the problems associated with
interpreting state practice and ascertaining whether such prac-
tice supports the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention.69
The birth of Pakistan came about after the separation of India
in 1947.70 Pakistan emerged out of two distinct land masses,
separated not only by hundreds of miles, but also by ethnic,
linguistic, and cultural differences. 7' Only Islam and the ha-
tred of India bound the country together.'2
In December 1970, an East Pakistani secessionist group,
the Awami League, won a majority of seats in the Pakistan As-
sembly. 73 The President of Pakistan, part of the controlling
West Pakistan regime, proposed to hold a meeting at which the
65. STARKE, supra note 3, at 34.
66. SHAW, supra note 1, at 70. "It is how states behave in practice that forms the
basis of customary law ...." Id.
67. Id. at 60. "[The rules] are not ... written down or codified, [but] survive
ultimately because of what can be called an aura of historical legitimacy." Id.
68. Id. at 61. "The existence of customary rules can be deduced from the prac-
tice and behaviour of states and this is where the problems begin. How can one tell
when a particular line of action adopted by a state reflects a legal rule or is merely
prompted by, for example, courtesy?" Id.
69. Compare TEs6N, supra note 5, at 185 ("The case ...is an almost perfect
example of humanitarian intervention.") with Franck & Rodley, supra note 5, at 276
("[T]he Bangladesh case ... does not constitute the basis for a definable, workable,
or desirable new rule of law which, in the future, would make certain kinds of unilat-
eral military interventions permissible.").
70. See, e.g., James A. Michener, A Lament for Pakistan, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 9, 1972,
§ 6 (Magazine) at 11, 39.
71. Id. at 39, 43-46.
72. Id.
73. Behuniak, supra note 50, at 175.
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Assembly would draft a new Pakistani constitution. 74  The
President reneged on this promise and indefinitely postponed
the meeting. 75 The resulting backlash in East Pakistan materi-
alized in the form of protests, riots, and demonstrations by
Bengalis, who were the inhabitants of the area and supporters
of the Awami League.76
Soon after Awami League supporters gained control of
East Pakistan,77 the Pakistani Army attacked Dacca, the capital
of East Pakistan, without warning.7 The Pakistani army
gained control of the capital, used military force against many
unarmed civilians,79 outlawed the Awami League, and arrested
many of the Awami League leaders.8 0 Following the deaths of
approximately 10,000 Bengalis, approximately nine to ten mil-
lion Bengali refugees flowed across the border into India."'
With this massive influx of refugees came disease and scarcities
of food and housing, causing severe hardship on India's eco-
nomic and political security."2 Simultaneously, Pakistan was vi-
olating minimal standards of human rights by killing massive
numbers of Bengali civilians, destroying villages, committing
rape, torture and murder, and executing individuals without
trials.8"
Following a Pakistani attack on an Indian air base located
miles within the Indian border, India militarily intervened in
74. Id.
75. Pakistan Postpones Assembly in Conflict of Major Parties, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1971,
at Al.
76. Dacca Disorderi Bring a Curfew, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1971, at A7.
77. Tillman Durdin, Army's Rule Cut in East Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1971,
at Al.
78. Ved P. Nanda, A Critique of the United Nations Inaction in the Bangladesh Crisis, 49
DENVER L.J. 53, 55 (1972).
79. Both Sides Claim Gains in Pakistan; All News Banned, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1971,
at A 1; Leader of Rebels in East Pakistan Reported Seized, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1971, at A 1;
Pakistan Reports Opposition in East Has Been Crushed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1971, at Al;
Sydney H. Schanberg, Heavy Fighting, Raids Reported in East Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
28, 1971, at Al.
80. See generally Behuniak, supra note 50, at 175.
81. See generally id.; RoNzrrrl, supra note 5, at 95.
82. Bengali Cholera Grows; India Asks World Aid, N.Y. TIMES,June 1, 1971, at A14;
Sydney H. Schanberg, Refugee Children in India: 'Thousands' Die, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30,
1971, at A10; Berjamin Welles, Plan To Woo Back Bengalis Weighed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
21, 1971, at A7.
83. East Pakistan Staff Study, in 8 REVIEw 23, 31 (1972).
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East Pakistan.84 Within a few days, the Pakistani army surren-
dered, political prisoners were released, and the extreme
human rights violations stopped.85 Also, the new country of
Bangladesh emerged out of East Pakistan.
Before India intervened, however, the Indian government
appealed to foreign governments and to the United Nations to
remedy the situation.86 Foreign governments and the United
Nations failed to respond to India's appeals for aid. India's use
of military force followed months of inaction by the interna-
tional community."7 The United Nations failed to prevent or
even address the human rights abuses taking place in East Pak-
istan.8
Because humanitarian intervention is illegal, states that do
act with predominantly humanitarian motives are forced to
profess pretextual motivations to the international commu-
nity.89 The defenses India proffered in justifying its actions
before the United Nations changed over time. The Indian gov-
ernment initially maintained that humanitarian motives justi-
fied the use of force.90 Ultimately, however, India did not rely
84. See generally Behuniak, supra note 50, at 176.
85. Id.
86. Verwey, supra note 7, at 401 n.2 10.
87. Behuniak, supra note 50, at 176.
88. TES6N, supra note 5, at 185. The U.N. response to the crises was resoundly
lambasted. See id. ("Writers have unanimously criticized the total inability of the
United Nations to even address, let alone stop, the massacres, and to prevent the
Indo-Pakistani war."); Behuniak, supra note 50, at 176 ("During the crisis, the U.N.
and its peacekeeping machinery floundered badly, unable to take any effective action
to bring to an end the gross violations of human rights in East Pakistan."); Nanda,
supra note 78, at 65 ("The United Nations failed to prevent the crisis. It failed to
deter the Pakistani regime from using excssive [sic] force in East Pakistan. It failed to
stop the war. Above all, it failed even to attempt to persuade or coerce the parties to
arrive at a political settlement.").
89. See RoNzrrri, supra note 5, at 108-09.
90. See, e.g., Franck & Rodley, supra note 5, at 276 (citing U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1606,
at 86 (1971)). "[W]e have . . . absolutely nothing but the purest of motives and the
purest of intentions: to rescue the people of East Bengal from what they are suffer-
ing." Id. Furthermore, the Indian representative in the General Assembly also de-
clared
[T]he reaction of the people of India to the massive killing of unarmed peo-
ple by military force has been intense and sustained .... There is intense
sorrow and shock and horror at the reign of terror that has been let loose.
The common bonds of race, religion, culture, history and geography of the
people of East Pakistan with the neighbouring Indian state of West Bengal
contribute powerfully to the feelings of the Indian people.
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on humanitarian intervention.9' Rather, India proffered self-
defense under Article 51 of the Charter to justify its use of mil-
itary force.9 2 This type of legal gamesmanship, where a state
professes to conform its actions with established precedent de-
spite the state's true motives has, in part, led to the current
debate over whether humanitarian intervention should be le-
galized. In addition to India, both Tanzania 93 and Vietnam 94
failed to invoke humanitarian intervention when there were
obvious egregious human rights violations occurring in the
states against which they used military force.95
II. THE CURRENT DISPUTE OVER HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION
Although unilateral humanitarian intervention is currently
considered illegal in international law because the accepted in-
terpretation of the U.N. Charter requires such illegality, 96 a
growing number of authors would have humanitarian interven-
tion legalized. 97 These commentators believe that a revised in-
terpretation of the Charter would establish the legality of hu-
manitarian intervention. Such an interpretation focuses on an
understanding of the conditions under which the U.N. Charter
was drafted and evaluates the subsequent history of the United
TES6N, supra note 5, at 186, n.187 (citing 26 U.N. GAOR, 2002d Sess., at 14, U.N.
Doc. A/PV 2002 (1971)).
91. Behuniak, supra note 50, at 176-77; Detlev F. Vagts, International Law Under
Time Pressure: Grading the Grenada Take-Home Examination, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 169, 170
(1984) ("It is significant that India did not justify its operations in Bangladesh... as a
humanitarian intervention but as a response to aggression.").
92. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 26th Sess., 1606th mtg., at 15, cited in Michael
Akehurst, Humanitarian Intervention, in INTERVENTION IN WORLD POLITICS 95, 96 n. 12
(H. Bull ed., 1984).
93. See infra notes 121-27 and accompanying text (outlining use of force by
Tanzania in Uganda against Idi Amin's regime).
94. See, e.g., RONzrrri, supra note 5, at 98-101. Soon after the Khmer Rouge
took power in Kampuchea in 1975, it started to systematically torture and murder
massive numbers of citizens. Id. at 98. Over 2,000,000 people died within three
years. Id. In 1978, Vietnam invaded Kampuchea and the Khmer Rouge government
was ousted. Id. at 98-99. The government of Vietnam declared that their reason for
intervening was self-defense, in response to various border clashes between the two
states. Id. at 99.
95. See RONZrTrr, supra note 5, at 109.
96. See supra note 7 (listing authors who argue that humanitarian intervention
should remain illegal).
97. See supra note 12 (listing authors who argue that humanitarian intervention
should be legal).
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Nations. 98 Interpretations of state practice, including the India
case above, may support both the illegality and the legality of
humanitarian intervention.
A. Humanitarian Intervention Is Currently Illegal
The overriding concern of those commentators who pre-
fer that humanitarian intervention remain illegal is the fear of
potential abuse by stronger states seeking political gain to the
detriment of weaker states.99 These commentators argue that
states which desire to engage in war could too easily invoke the
doctrine as a pretext for unlawful, selfish, or political goals.'0 0
Arguably, the most blatant abuse of the doctrine of humanita-
rian intervention was perpetrated by Hitler, who invoked the
doctrine to justify using military force in Czechoslovakia in
1938, disguising his motive as a protest against the extreme
mistreatment of ethnic Germans in that country.' 0 ' Also, many
weaker states would be unable to employ humanitarian inter-
vention due to their inability to prevent the human rights
abuses.' 0 2 Thus, commentators who support the illegality of
humanitarian intervention state that a sense of fairness sup-
ports its illegality.10 3 Because only stronger states could em-
98. See supra note 24 (discussing U.N. resolutions passed since 1945 supporting
legality of humanitarian intervention).
99. See, e.g., Jost Delbrilck, A Fresh Look at Humanitarian Intervention Under the Au-
thority of the United Nations, 67 IND. L.J. 887, 891 (1992) ("[T]he door to purely arbi-
trary intervention, that is, acts of aggression in disguise, would be wide open."); see
also Schachter, supra note 7, at 1629 ("The reluctance of governments to legitimize
foreign invasion in the interest of humanitarianism is understandable in the light of
past abuses by powerful states.").
100. Franck & Rodley, supra note 5, at 284.
101. See id. Professors Franck and Rodley concluded that "[some past invoca-
tions of humanitarian intervention] are so clearly bogus as to be worth examining
only to indicate the abuse to which the asserted right is so commonly subject." Id.
102. ASRAT, supra note 4, at 186. Professor Asrat argues that because strong
states would probably not suffer intervention, the doctrine would not be uniformly
enforced, and thus humanitarian intervention should remain illegal. Id. "[S]uch in-
tervention would normally be the defacto prerogative of States possessing adequate
human and material resources; its exercise would necessarily be discretionary, and
most probably would not be undertaken against powerful States. These factors
would make it discriminatory and hence unsatisfactory as a legally sanctioned rem-
edy." Id. (citations omitted). Professor Asrat admits that "[diespite these defects,
however, were a forcible humanitarian intervention to be undertaken in the proper
instances, the breach of the target State's territorial integrity would probably be con-
sidered to deserve extenuation." Id.
103. Id.
136 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 16:120
ploy humanitarian intervention, many commentators argue
that it should remain illegal. 0 4
1. The Traditional Interpretation of the Charter Renders
Humanitarian Intervention Illegal
When the U.N. Charter was enacted, Article 2(4)"05
banned the use of force for any reason, except in self-de-
fense 0 6 and when authorized by the Security Council. 107 Au-
thors traditionally interpret this section as prohibiting humani-
tarian intervention. 0 The Charter's ban on the use of force
was enacted to preserve territorial integrity and political inde-
pendence. °9 The Charter's collective security measures were
to ensure peace." 0 Although humanitarian intervention was
not expressly forbidden, the Charter effectively forbids its use
through its general provisions regarding the use of force."'
U.N. resolutions passed after the ratification of the Charter
support the illegality of humanitarian intervention." l
2
2. Many Authors Argue That State Practice Does Not
Legalize Humanitarian Intervention
Commentators advocating the illegality of humanitarian
intervention argue that the military actions of the recent past,
i.e. state practices, do not support the legalization of unilateral
humanitarian intervention."13 These commentators argue that
104. See, e.g., BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 5, at 338-42; AslAT,
supra note 4, at 186.
105. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4. For the text of article 2(4), see supra note 57.
106. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. For the text of article 51, see supra note 58.
107. U.N. CHARTER ch. VII; see supra note 11 (stating that only Security Council
can legally authorize force).
108. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 5, at 342. "[I]t is extremely
doubtful if [humanitarian] intervention has survived the . . . general prohibition of
resort to force to be found in the United Nations Charter." Id. (citations omitted).
109. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4.
110. RoNzrrrx, supra note 5, at 92.
111. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 5, at 342.
112. See supra note 25 (discussing the U.N. resolutions which support the illegal-
ity of humanitarian intervention). "[T]he... individual use of force has been super-
seded by the United Nations Charter and its emphasis upon collective state action
through the Security Council." Bazylar, supra note 12, at 575.
113. Verwey, supra note 7. These actions include the 1975 Indonesian interven-
tion in East Timor, the 1975 South African intervention in Angola, the 1978 Belgian
intervention in Zaire, and the 1983 U.S. intervention in Grenada. For a review of the
above, see id.
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states that intervened in the past usually did so for their own
political gain, not out of humanitarian motives."t 4 They also
argue that there are no precedents for the validation of hu-
manitarian intervention." 5 In the past, when a state could
have argued justifiably that it intervened for humanitarian rea-
sons, it proffered more well-accepted doctrines, like self-de-
fense. " 6
In evaluating state practice, commentators opposed to the
legality of humanitarian intervention argue that the India case
supports their viewpoint. "' They state that while humanita-
rian interests were involved, India clearly had ulterior, non-hu-
manitarian motives."' These ulterior motives included re-
sponding to the bombing of an Indian airport, relieving the
economic strain on India caused by the millions of Bengali ref-
ugees, and dealing a political blow to its neighbor and rival,
Pakistan."t 9 Thus, commentators argue that India acted more
for political gain and self-interest than out of humanitarian
concerns. 1
20
The Tanzania case is another example of how a state failed
to invoke humanitarian intervention for its use of military force
when it arguably could have.' 2' President Idi Amin's rule of
Uganda from 1971 to 1979 was widely known as extremely
brutal and repressive, and was compared with Hitler's rule of
114. See, e.g., Schachter, supra note 7, at 1629 ("States strong enough to inter-
vene and sufficiently interested in doing so tend to have political motives.").
115. Franck & Rodley, supra note 5, at 290. Professors Franck and Rodley dis-
cussed numerous situations in which humanitarian intervention could have been in-
voked but was not. Id. These situations included when military force was employed
but the intervening state proffered a different reason, and situations when interven-
tion on humanitarian grounds was warranted, yet no state intervened militarily. Id.
They concluded that "[a] 'right' so little exercised in circumstances where morality, if
not law, most craves its application is rightly suspect." Id.
116. RoNzrriT, supra note 5, at 108. When discussing examples of when states
reasonably could have invoked humanitarian intervention to justify their use of mili-
tary force, Mr. Ronzitti refers to, inter alia, India in 1971 and Tanzania in 1979 (the
intervention in Uganda at the end of Idi Amin's regime). Id. He states that "these
States took good care not to invoke the doctrine of humanitarian intervention and
preferred to ground the lawfulness of their actions on sounder arguments." Id.
117. See, e.g., id.
118. Verwey, supra note 7, at 402. "[It is] clear that non-humanitarian motives
also played a decisive role in the Indian action." Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See generally RoNzrrrTn, supra note 5, at 102-06.
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Germany and Stalin's rule of Russia as far as human rights
were concerned. 122 Neither the United Nations nor the Organ-
ization of African Unity took action to stop, prevent, or hinder
Amin's repression. 123 In 1979, Tanzania invaded Uganda and
overthrew Amin. 124 After the intervention, Tanzania did not
seek to annex any Ugandan territory, install a puppet govern-
ment, or seek to exert political influence over Uganda after the
intervention. 25 Thus, it is argued that this use of military
force is also a valid precedent of state practice to support the
legality of humanitarian intervention. 126 However, Tanzania
proffered that its use of force was in response to border clashes
with Uganda, so that it took action in self-defense, not for hu-
manitarian reasons.
127
B. Many Commentators Argue That Limited Unilateral
Humanitarian Intervention Should Be Legal
For a variety of reasons and in various ways, a contingent
of authors argue that humanitarian intervention should be
legal.'12  These authors argue that when a government com-
mits egregious human rights abuses against its citizens, and
when international organizations fail to prevent these abuses, a
state should have a right of unilateral humanitarian interven-
tion, within certain limits, to prevent those abuses. 129 Legal,
moral, and practical justifications are offered in support of the
legality of humanitarian intervention. 130 It is argued that the
Charter and subsequent resolutions also support humanitarian
intervention. 13 ' Furthermore, commentators claim that the
state practice that has developed since the inception of the
Charter sufficiently supports the legalization of humanitarian
intervention. 132
122. See Bazylar, supra note 12, at 590.
123. Id. at 591.
124. Id. at 590.
125. Id. at 591-92.
126. See generally id.
127. RONZrrri, supra note 5, at 103.
128. See supra note 12 (listing authors who advocate the legalization of the doc-
trine of humanitarian intervention).
129. See, e.g., Lillich, Self-Help, supra note 12.
130. See infra notes 133-43 and accompanying text.
131. See infra notes 144-52 and accompanying text.
132. See infra notes 153-61 and accompanying text.
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1. Legal, Moral, and Practical Justifications for Legalizing
Humanitarian Intervention
Some commentators argue that legal arguments support
the legality of humanitarian intervention. It has been prof-
fered that states that commit such egregious human rights vio-
lations lose their legitimacy under international law.' 33 States'
rights to exist derive not from any supposed international or-
der, but rather from the duty of the government to protect the
rights of the individual citizens.' 3 4 A state forfeits its legiti-
macy when it commits human rights violations, and another
state can legally intervene on behalf of the oppressed citi-
zens. 1
35
These commentators are also concerned with the preser-
vation of humanity, and value human life over adherence to
legal principles.' 3 6 According to these authors, basic humani-
133. TES6N, supra note 5, at 15.
[B]ecause the ultimate justification of the existence of states is the protec-
tion and enforcement of the natural rights of the citizens, a government that
engages in substantial violations of human rights betrays the very purpose
for which it exists and so forfeits not only its domestic legitimacy, but its
international legitimacy as well.
Id.; see Levitin, supra note 12, at 652 (arguing that governments which commit mas-
sive human rights abuses forfeit their legitimacy). The United Nations expelled the
Serbian delegation from the seat previously held by Yugoslavia. See Paul Lewis, U.N.
Assembly Expels Belgrade Over Its Role in Bosnia Fighting, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1992, at
Al. The decision was based in part on Serbia's refusal to make peace in the region
and its policy of "ethnic cleansing." Id.
134. TEs6N, supra note 5, at 112. Mr. Tes6n developed a theory based upon the
social contract. Id. "States and governments exist because individuals have con-
sented, or would ideally consent, to transfer some of their rights in order to make
social cooperation possible." Id. Thus, there is no distinction between the rights of
citizens of one state and the rights of foreigners; all people deserve protection where
human rights are concerned, and therefore humanitarian intervention should be
legal. Id. at 113-14.
135. See, e.g., id. at 15. In examining the United Nations' record on the protec-
tion of human rights, one author concluded that egregious or severe violations "are
no longer essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of States, and therefore the
principle of nonintervention is not applicable." Felix Ermacora, Human Rights and
Domestic Jurisdiction (Article 2, § 7 of the Charter), 124 RECUEIL DES COURs bk. II, 371,
436 (1968); see B. De Schutter, Humanitarian Intervention: A United Nations Task, 3 CAL.
W. INT'L LJ. 26 (1972) ("Abuse of a generally recognized right can lead to its sup-
pression and the removal of a state's immunity."); Levitin, supra note 12, at 652 (ar-
guing that governments which commit massive human rights abuses forfeit their le-
gitimacy).
136. Lillich, Self-Help, supra note 12, at 344. The doctrine of humanitarian inter-
vention appeals to the average person's sense of morality and justice. Id. The doc-
trine "is the expression of a profound and innate sense of justice corresponding to
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tarian sentiments support the view that no person can remain
idle in the midst of government-sponsored slaughter.' Also,
defensive wars to protect human rights are considered the only
morally justifiable wars.'13
In addition, these authors recognize that in practice, the
U.N. collective security measures usually fail to prevent the
most egregious cases of human rights violations.' 3 9 Numerous
instances exist of the obvious failures of the U.N. collective se-
curity measures to provide the international security for which
they were designed.' 40 The most recent examples include the
former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Sudan, and Iraq. 4 ' Furthermore,
not responding to extreme human rights violations causes dic-
tators to believe that they can commit massive human rights
the natural feelings and reactions of the average person." East Pakistan Staff Study,
supra note 83, at 60; see Lillich, Self-Help, supra note 12, at 344 ("Surely to require a
state to sit back and watch the slaughter of innocent people in order to avoid violat-
ing blanket prohibitions against the use of force is to stress blackletter [law] at the
expense of far more fundamental values.").
137. Arthur A. Leff, Food for Biaftans, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1968, at A46. Profes-
sor Leff of Yale Law School has succinctly and eloquently summarized the position of
many people who support the legalization of humanitarian intervention: "I don't
much care about international law, Biafra or Nigeria. Babies are dying in Biafra ....
Forget all the blather about international law, sovereignty and self-determination, all
that abstract garbage: babies are starving to death." Id.
138. TEs6N, supra note 5, at 247.
139. Fonteyne, supra note 12, at 237.
It is in those extreme cases where the most fundamental human rights are
massively threatened, that the United Nations and the regional organiza-
tions, paralyzed by Major Power disagreements and the reluctance of the
New States to accept any infringement upon the sacrosanct principles of
sovereign independence and nonintervention in a setting lacking colonial
and para-colonial aspects, have been unable or unwilling to take any signifi-
cant measures.
Id. (citations omitted).
140. Id. at 237. "Biafra, Indonesia, Sudan, Burundi, Bangladesh, and more re-
cently, Uganda are but the most recent bloody examples of the unfortunate passivity
and ineffectiveness of the international organizations." Id. (citations omitted).
141. See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text; see also Aryeh Neier, Watching
Rights, NATION, Sept. 28, 1992, at 317 ("[T]he U.N. record.., in Bosnia and Somalia
... is disastrous. The U.N.'s priorities have been wrong and, especially in Somalia,
its performance in the field has been execrable."); Shirley Hazzard, System Failure: The
Trouble With the U.N., NEw REPUBLIC, Sept. 21, 1992, at 16 (stating that, in reference
to the lack of effective U.N. response to the current international crises, "the U.N.
administration has shown itself, for all its greater funds and advantages, less prompt
and enterprising than the Red Cross or the smallest voluntary agencies. The con-
fused state of the numerous U.N. relief agencies has been the subject of scandal and
concern for many years").
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abuses with impunity.' 4 2 It was recognized very early in the
U.N. era that the collective security measures of the Security
Council might not be able to prevent serious tragedy, and that
an individual state might retain the right to unilateral action. 4
2. Some Authors Argue That Charter Interpretation
Legalizes Humanitarian Intervention
Authors interpret the Charter in various ways to support
the argument that unilateral humanitarian intervention should
be legal. One thesis is that unilateral humanitarian interven-
tion supports the purposes of the U.N. Charter because the
preservation of human rights is one of the Charter's primary
goals. 144 Another thesis is that humanitarian intervention does
not violate Article 2(4) of the Charter because an altruistic hu-
manitarian intervention impairs neither the territorial integrity
nor the political independence of the target state.' 45 This is
because an altruistic humanitarian intervention maintains the
territorial boundaries of the target state. 146 If the government
of the target state is overthrown, the political independence of
the state is not impaired because the government forfeited its
legitimacy. 147
Some authors state that in cases where U.N. approval of
the use of military force is extremely difficult to obtain, human-
itarian intervention should be legal. 148 This conditional ap-
proach would render humanitarian intervention illegal once
142. Bazylar, supra note 12, at 618-619.
143. P.JESsuP, A MODERN LAw OF NATIONS 170 (4th ed. 1952). Shortly after the
ratification of the U.N. Charter, Professor Philip C. Jessup asserted that "[ilt would
seem that the only possible argument against the substitution of collective measures
under the Security Council for individual measures by a single state would be the
inability of the international organization to act with the speed requisite to preserve
life." Id.
144. TES6N, supra note 5, at 131. "[Tjhe promotion of human rights is a main
purpose of the United Nations. ... [T]he use of force to remedy serious human
rights deprivations, far from being 'against the purposes' of the U.N. Charter, serves




148. See, e.g. ,John Mackinlay &Jarat Chopra, Second Generation Multinational Oper-
ations, 15 WASH. Q 113 (1992). Before the fall of the Soviet Union, the Security
Council was bogged down in super power in-fighting. Id. The end of the cold war
might change this, many critics say. Id. "The end of the Cold War marks the rebirth
of the United Nations (UN) and the start of its second generation as an institution.
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U.N. security measures function as they were intended.'4 9 In
addition, another theory evaluates the legislative history of the
U.N. Charter and concludes that because the drafters could
have explicitly banned humanitarian intervention but did not
do so, it remains legal. 150 Because law evolves over time, com-
mentators argue that Article 2(4) should not be read without
reference to the present political and technological situa-
tion. 5' Lastly, it is proffered that the international community
should affirmatively recognize an exception to Article 2(4) to
allow for humanitarian intervention. 152
3. Some Authors Argue That State Practice Legalizes
Humanitarian Intervention
It is argued that recent state practice supports the legaliza-
tion of humanitarian intervention. Precedents do exist to sup-
port such a theory, these commentators argue. 153 These com-
Incapacitated for its first 40 years by a deeply divided Security Council, the UN is
rediscovering its original mandate as it faces the demands of a new era." Id.
149. Lillich, A Reply, supra note 12, at 240. Preferring collective action to unilat-
eral action, as most would agree is proper, Professor Lillich states that "[this ap-
proach] is preferable in that it clearly contemplates the gradual phasing out of the
doctrine as the United Nations develops the capacity and the will to act in such situa-
tions." Id.
150. See Fonteyne, supra note 12, at 243-58.
151. Reisman, supra note 12, at 644. Recognizing that the framework for the
politics of the international community changes over time, Professor Reisman argues
that
[o]ne should not seek point-for-point conformity to a rule without constant
regard for the policy or principle that animated its prescription, and with
appropriate regard for the factual constellation in the minds of the drafters
.... Article 2(4) ... is premised on a political context and a technological
environment that have been changing inexorably since the end of the 19th
century.
Id.
152. Levitin, supra note 12, at 652. Professor Levitin assumes the position that
the Charter does outlaw humanitarian intervention, but proffers that an exception for
the doctrine should be drafted. Id. "International law ought [to] recognize an ex-
ception to article 2(4) and allow intervention for the specific and limited purpose of
altering the conditions within a territory when the government of that territory is
committing extensive violations of its peoples' minimum human rights." Id.
153. See, e.g., TEs6N, supra note 5, at 5-6. France recently took action which
arguably satisfies the requirements of a minimal altruistic humanitarian intervention
by sending French military troops into the Sarajevo airport in support of United Na-
tions humanitarian relief efforts. William Pfaff, Nations Must Lead When Collective Secur-
ity Stalls, Ir'L HERALD TRIB., July 11, 1992. The U.N. Security Council did not ex-
plicitly authorize the French use of military force, but France acted anyway. Id.
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mentators cite, inter alia, the Congo case of 1964,' the India
case of 197 1," and the Tanzania case of 1979.156 In each of
these cases, massive human rights atrocities were occurring
and states intervened militarily, to prevent further abuses.
In the India case, the situation warranted humanitarian in-
tervention, and India provided it.' 57 The Pakistani military as-
saulted unarmed civilians and massive human rights violations
continued unabated.' 58 The U.N. collective security measures
designed to prevent such events failed miserably. 59 Finally,
India intervened and stopped the abuses, which would surely
have continued without India's action. 60 Thus, India's inter-
vention has been called "an almost perfect example of humani-
tarian intervention."' 6 '
III. LIMITED UNILATERAL HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION SHOULD BE LEGAL
Humanitarian intervention should be legal but with limita-
tions designed to protect against disingenuous invocations of
the doctrine.'6  Today's world should not tolerate massive
France had little immediate concrete gain, except perhaps increasing its stature in the
world community. Id.
154. See, e.g., Bazylar, supra note 12, at 587. In 1964, a rebel army in the Congo
took foreigners from 18 nations hostage to aid their cause. Id. When compliance by
the Congo government was not forthcoming, the rebels threatened to kill the hos-
tages. Id. Belgian, U.S., and British forces combined in a military venture to rescue
hostages, and did so in four days. Id. The Congo government approved this use of
force, and the military forces departed immediately after the crisis was over. Id.
Thus, it is argued that this use of military force is a valid precedent of state practice to
support the legality of humanitarian intervention. See generally id.
155. See supra notes 69-92 and accompanying text (explaining the India case);
see also infra notes 160 and 161 (explaining reasons how India case supports legality
of humanitarian intervention).
156. See supra notes 121-27 and accompanying text (explaining the Tanzania
case).
157. See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text (describing human rights
abuses taking place in East Pakistan).
158. See id.
159. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (describing the lack of effective
U.N. response).
160. See TEs6N, supra note 5, at 185.
161. Id.
162. See supra note 12 (listing authors who argue that humanitarian intervention
should be legal). Authors who support the legality of humanitarian intervention rec-
ognize that there must be limitations on this right. See, e.g., Bazylar, supra note 12, at
597; Fonteyne, supra note 12, at 258; Lillich, Self-Help, supra note 12, at 345-46; John
N. Moore, The Control of Foreign Intervention in Internal Conflict, 9 VA.J. INT'L L. 209, 264
143
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human rights atrocities when, in contrast to previous eras,
modern technology has enhanced the possibility of detecting,
and therefore, preventing pretextual interventions.163 When a
state possesses the determination and the will to prevent egre-
gious abuses from occurring, the doctrine of humanitarian in-
tervention should permit such a state to intervene.' 64 A world
community purportedly committed to peaceful co-existence
should not remain idle while a state murders and tortures its
citizens.
Humanitarian intervention should be circumscribed to re-
duce incentives for the use of military force for self-interested,
political gain, and thus protect against the potential abuse of
the doctrine. Two levels of limitations best implement this
goal. The first level consists of absolute prerequisites wherein
humanitarian intervention should be legal only when the
human rights abuses are extreme and the international gov-
erning bodies are paralyzed and cannot prevent them. The
second level consists of caveats which are not absolute require-
ments, but provide rough guidelines by which states should
abide when invoking the doctrine of unilateral humanitarian
intervention. These caveats should distinguish between a dis-
ingenuous and an altruistic intervention.
A. Modern Technology Makes the Reasoning for Humanitarian
Intervention's Illegality Obsolete
Due to the advances in information systems technology,
an absolute ban on humanitarian intervention is no longer nec-
essary. 6 5 The ban is a remnant of the days when cold war ten-
sions were divisive, and suspicions about pretextual uses of
force were preeminent. 66 Thus, the theory of state sover-
(1969). Even Professor Wright, who argues that there are significant problems with
most traditional limitations proffered by the cited authors, recognizes that there
should be a standard, and hence a limitation, for humanitarian intervention. Wright,
supra note 12, at 462. That limitation is that a state's human rights violation must
"shock the conscience" before another state can legally employ military force. Id.
163. See infra notes 165-76 and accompanying text (discussing how modem
technology allows the true events taking place in another state to be known).
164. See, e.g., Lillich, Self-Help, supra note 12.
165. See infra notes 168-72 (discussing how human rights atrocities can be docu-
mented with new technologies).
166. See Lewis, supra note 5.
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eignty prevailed to protect against pretextual invocations.' 67
Information, observation and communication systems have
greatly enhanced the ability to confirm the existence of massive
human rights atrocities.168 Furthermore, the speed with which
information can be gathered and processed will only increase
in the future. The technology of satellites, 6 9 facsimile ma-
chines, video recorders, telecommunications systems, and fu-
ture as yet unknown devices advances almost daily. 170 Devel-
oping countries, where large-scale human rights abuses most
often occur, will soon benefit from these technological ad-
vances so that knowledge of human rights abuses will be avail-
able to the world community.' 7 ' Because of this advanced
technology, the international community can document human
rights atrocities and confirm the actual events occurring within
state borders. 72 A pretextual humanitarian intervention can
167. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing cold war tensions and
suspicions about pretextual uses of military force).
168. See, e.g., Steven V. Roberts et al., New Diplomacy By Fax Americana, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., June 19, 1989, at 32. "Direct dial telephones and satellite uplinks
carry information into countries like China, and they also carry it out. Those images
and ideas appear instantly on American television, engaging voters and altering the
environment of formal diplomacy." Id.
169. See Todd Halvorson, U.S. Spy Satellites Monitor Developments in Soviet Union,
GANNETr NEws SERVICE, Aug. 20, 1991, at 20. The United States currently has a
network of sophisticated spy satellites capable of photographing objects as small as a
license plate, seeing through darkness, and intercepting walkie-talkie communica-
tions on earth. Id. It was recently used to monitor Soviet activities during the 1991
attempted coup d'etat, which sought to oust Mikhail Gorbachev. Id.
170. See, e.g., id.; Roberts et al., supra note 168.
171. Roberts et al., supra note 168. Trade with China has increased dramatically
in recent years, including such goods as airplanes and computers. See id. In addition
to the facsimile machines changing the political climate for governments, there is still
the classic "ham" radio operator. John F. Burns, In Sarajevo, a Ham Operator Captures
the Horrors of War, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1992, at Al. In Bosnia and Herzegovina,
reports were coming out through "ham" radio operators that one of the many truces
signed during the conflict was not upheld. Id. As Serbian mortar fire still pounded
cities, the ham radio operator stated that "[the Serbians] have constantly lied in the
past, and anybody who believes that they are going to stop their killing now should
know that they are still lying." Id.
172. See Roberts et al., supra note 168. The number of facsimile transmissions
into and out of China during the Tienanmen Square massacre is well documented.
See John Hughes, China Turns Back the Clock, CHRISTIAN ScI. MoNIToR, June 14, 1989,
at 18 ("[The Chinese people] are getting clippings from newspapers around the
world, sent into China by facsimile machine from student communities and sympa-
thizers in various countries."). Technology such as this in the hands of citizens will
eventually prevent governments from covering up human rights abuses. Govern-
ments can no longer control all satellite transmissions into and out of its borders. Id.
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be discovered more easily and the state subjected to sanctions.
Meanwhile, altruistic humanitarian interventions will contrib-
ute to world peace and end human suffering.
Although faulty interpretation of information, manipula-
tion of information by human rights abusers, and devices to
defeat such technology may exist, the advances and improve-
ments of technology will advance significantly to overcome
these problems. 73 Currently, states that wish to conceal their
activities have numerous methods at their disposal to achieve
this result. 174 Thus, massive human rights violations are hid-
den. 1 75 These methods of hiding human rights abuses, how-
ever, become obsolete at a rate commensurate with advances
in the technology created to defeat them. 76 Due to this fact, if
humanitarian intervention were legal, the possibility of a disin-
genuous invocation of the doctrine would be significantly mini-
mized because such disingenuousness is recognizable.
If humanitarian intervention becomes legal, however, a
need will arise to control this technology to insure that human
rights violations are documented. International organizations
The Chinese student protestors fashioned a small statue of liberty, seen on American
television, during the standoff before the Tienanmen Square massacre designed, at
least in part, to capture the American public's conscience. See id.
In addition, states which commit human rights violations sometimes document
their activities with photographs and videotapes, and the documentation can fall into
enemy hands. See, e.g., Kurds Claim Proof of Iraqi Massacres, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec.
8, 1991, at HIO. Recently, Kurds in Iraq obtained letters, photographs, and video-
tapes documenting egregious Iraqi violations including executions. Id. This evi-
dence might be used against Saddam Hussein in a trial charging him with violating
the 1948 U.N. Convention on Genocide. Patrick E. Tyler, U.S. to Help Retrieve Data on
Iraqi Torture of Kurds, N.Y. TiMES, May 17, 1992, § 1, at 3.
173. See, e.g., infra note 176 (discussing the progress of making satellites that can
see through clouds and darkness).
174. See, e.g., Jeffrey T. Richelson, Although Impressive, Reconnaissance Can't Get An-
swers Overnight, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 17, 1991, at H4. Currently, most U.S.
satellites cannot see through darkness or clouds. Id. No U.S. satellites can see inside
buildings or shelters. Id.
175. See, e.g., id. During the U.S.-led war against Iraq, Iraq kept its missiles hid-
den in shelters, caves, or underground structures during the day. William J. Broad,
War In the Gulf The Damage; Assessing Damage Can Be Fettered by the Weather and Pilot
Hyperbole, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 24, 1991, at A12. These tactics were effective in hindering
the U.S. reconnaissance effort. Id. Other tactics possibly included rolling out paper
painted to look like bomb craters. Id. The Iraqis were extremely effective at deceiv-
ing the U.S. intelligence network. Id.
176. See, e.g., Richelson, supra note 174. Currently only one type of U.S. imag-
ing satellite can see through clouds. Id. The U.S. will obviously launch more in the
future. Id.
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should coordinate efforts to monitor events in all states. 17 7
Many individual states should also have the ability and the
equipment to observe the events in other states to combat the
possibility that centralized control of the devices will itself lead
to abuse. Such checks and balances will work towards minimiz-
ing manipulation of these systems by any one particular polit-
ical state or organization.17 8
Any doctrine that allows a state to act unilaterally is sub-
ject to potential abuse, but the possibility of abuse should not
render humanitarian intervention illegal.' 79 Because an inter-
venor must decide for itself whether conditions in the target
state warrant military action, the legalization of humanitarian
intervention may create the potential for abuse.' This poten-
tial abuse should not cause an outright ban on humanitarian
intervention. States act at their own peril, subject to review,
and possible reprisal, by the international community.' 8 '
Any individual state action which is permitted, such as
self-defense, may result in potential abuse, but this potential
abuse applies to almost every legal rule. 82 Obviously, not all
states that invoke the doctrine of self-defense, a legal right, to
justify their use of force, do so truthfully. The benefits of self-
defense, however, legitimize the doctrine despite the potential
abuse of its invocation. 183 The same should be said for hu-
177. Leonard Doyle, Washington Opposes Spy Role for U.N., INDEPENDENT, Apr. 20,
1992, at 9. Recently, various nations have proposed that the United Nations expand
into intelligence-gathering and analysis services. Id. These states include Russia, the
Nordic countries, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Id. This proposal is fiercely
opposed by the United States. Id. The Russian proposal mentions using this spy
network to protect oppressed citizens from dictatorial governments. Id.
178. The question then arises whether this type of observation is legal. The
answer is that this observation should be a condition of acceptance into the interna-
tional community. Furthermore, espionage and counter-espionage is a fact of life for
the international community. It has gone on in the past, it goes on presently, and it
will continue in the future.
179. MYRES McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER 416 (1961). "A policy of permitting individual initiative is, of course,
again like the policy of allowing self-defense, susceptible to perverting abuse; but this
susceptibility is an attribute common to all legal policy, doctrine, or rule." Id.
180. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (describing commentators' fear
that stronger states would abuse humanitarian intervention).
181. McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 179, at 416.
182. Id.
183. See, e.g., Schachter, supra note 7. The right to use force in self-defense is
legalized in article 51 of the U.N. Charter. See supra note 58 for the text of article 51.
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manitarian intervention.
As humanitarian intervention is currently illegal, potential
intervenors with the will and the desire to prevent human
rights abuses are deterred from intervening because they face
the political cost of international condemnation even when
they engage in justifiable military intervention. 84 This unfair
result would not occur if humanitarian intervention were legal.
The legality of humanitarian intervention would increase the
pool of potential intervenors, and after the doctrine is em-
ployed, human rights violations would decrease due to the fear
of potential intervention.' 85
The legality of humanitarian intervention does not gener-
ate any incentive to use force pretextually because detection of
a pretextual invocation is highly likely. Thus, the state faces
the same international condemnation for the use of force as it
would if humanitarian intervention were illegal. 8 6  Further-
more, the current illegality of humanitarian intervention does
not deter a state with selfish political motives from acting be-
cause the state may invoke other doctrines for military ac-
tion. 8 7 Simply invoking the doctrine as a pretext cannot vali-
date a state's actions. Therefore, legalizing humanitarian in-
tervention imposes limited costs to international stability,
while increasing benefits to international peace by removing
184. Wright, supra note 12, at 453. "[Tjhe force of international condemnation
of intervention remains, whether such condemnation is justified or not." Id.
185. Id. Professor Wright argues that a legal right of humanitarian intervention
would decrease the number of human rights violations because the fear of interven-
tion would deter states from committing such abuses. Id. "A broader theory ofjusti-
fied humanitarian intervention, to the extent that it tends to enhance either the
probability or the severity of sanctions imposed on inhumane governments, may well
reduce the incidence of human rights violations through a classic deterrence effect."
Id. (citations omitted).
186. Id. Professor Wright has called the condemnation that a state receives
when its military actions are not approved by the international community as the
"sheer magnitude of the international diplomatic pillorying undergone by the inter-
venor." Id.
187. Id. at 450. Using. the Soviet Union as an example, Professor Wright expli-
cates that numerous methods exist to pretextually justify the use of military force.
It seems fair to suggest, however, that even a substantial liberalization of the
doctrine of humanitarian intervention would not lead to a significant in-
crease in Soviet abuse. [Numerous other] . . . purported justifications for
external adventures [exist], such as the Brezhnev doctrine, wars of national
liberation, mutual defense obligations, and the presumed categorical superi-
ority of the socialist system.
Id. at 450-51 (citations omitted).
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potential drawbacks for states with altruistic motives.' 88
B. Charter Interpretation and State Practice Can Legalize
Humanitarian Intervention
The Charter permits humanitarian intervention as evi-
denced by its preamble,'8 9 the Charter itself,' 90 and the
number of derivative resolutions passed since its inception that
seek to protect human rights. 19' These resolutions have equal-
ized the importance of the protection of human rights with the
preservation of state sovereignty.92 Under the rubric of state
practice, it must be understood that it is practically impossible
for a state to intervene with purely altruistic motives.' 93 But,
when humanitarian motives predominate over political goals,
the intervening state should not face international condemna-
tion for its actions. Viewed in this way, state practice supports
the legality of humanitarian intervention.
1. Reinterpreting the U.N. Charter
Reinterpreting the Charter to permit humanitarian inter-
vention would not undermine the ban on the use of force pro-
vided by Article 2(4). The U.N. Charter dictates that the use of
force is banned when such force operates against the territorial
188. Id. at 454. Legalizing the doctrine of humanitarian intervention would lead
to a strengthening of all international laws because it promotes respect for basic
moral values. Id. "[H]umanitarian intervention may ... contribute to the sense of
the basic equitableness of the system of laws in such a way as to strengthen the sys-
tem of laws on balance." Id. at 455.
189. U.N. CHARTER pmbl. The preamble states that the United Nations is deter-
mined to "reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the
human person, in the equal rights of men and women." Id.
190. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 3. Article 1(3) states that one of the main purposes
of the United Nations is "to achieve international co-operation in solving interna-
tional problems of a[] ... humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as
to race, sex, language, or religion." Id.
191. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing resolutions passed
subsequent to ratification of Charter supporting protection of human rights).
192. Louis B. Sohn, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 8J. INT'L COMMIS-
SIONJUR. 17, 23 (1967). "[The Universal Declaration of Human Rights] was adopted
unanimously, without a dissenting vote, [so] it can be considered as an authoritative
interpretation of the Charter of the highest order." Id.
193. See infra note 220 and accompanying text (discussing impossibility of pre-
cluding every other motivation for intervention before allowing intervention on hu-
manitarian grounds).
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integrity and political independence of other states, and incon-
sistently with the purposes of the United Nations.' 94 The
Charter itself speaks of the preservation of human rights as
one of its main purposes. 95 When collective security breaks
down, individual states should act to uphold the purposes of
the international community.' 96 Also, the numerous docu-
ments and resolutions supporting human rights further raise
the level of respect members of the international community
should afford to the protection of human rights.' 97 Further-
more, an altruistic humanitarian intervention does not result in
the territorial conquest or political subjugation against which
the Charter was designed to protect. The territorial bounda-
ries of the target state remain unchanged and the intervenor
departs from the oppressed state once the crisis passes.' 98
Humanitarian intervention's legality should be condi-
tioned upon inaction by international organizations that are
designed to ensure peace and human rights.' 99 The ability to
use unilateral military force should be phased out when those
organizations become effective vehicles of prevention. 20 0 A le-
galized doctrine of humanitarian intervention within these pa-
rameters strikes a well-balanced order for the interests of the
world community.20 '
The United Nations is currently moving towards legalizing
military humanitarian intervention, albeit only military action
through the Security Council, in support of humanitarian aid
and relief supplies.20 2 Resolutions recently passed dictate that
194. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4. For the text of article 2(4), see supra note 57.
195. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 3. For the text of article 1(3), see supra note 190.
196. TES6N, supra note 5, at 131.
197. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
198. See TEs6N, supra note 5, at 131. The author of this Note recognizes that the
India case previously mentioned resulted in the formation of a new state, but the
Bengalis' right to self-determination was generally recognized as legitimate. Id.
Thus, although the general principle of humanitarian intervention was not followed
perfectly in the India case, the situation warranted humanitarian intervention, and
thus India's intervention was justified. See supra notes 69-92 (explaining the India
case); see generally TEs6N, supra note 5, at 184; LEO KUPER, THE PREVENTION OF GENO-
CIDE (1985) (discussing the legitimacy of Bangladesh as an independent state).
199. W. MICHAEL REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION 848-49 (1971).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See generally Lewis, supra note 5 (describing recent actions within United
Nations to recognize that humanitarian aid should be sent to citizens within states
even when those states' governments do not consent to receiving aid).
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even without the consent of the target state, the United Na-
tions is not prohibited from intervening to provide humanita-
rian relief.203 The United Nations will no doubt continue to
pass such resolutions in the future.
2. Interpreting State Practice
Realism dictates that a state will always have more than
one motivation for taking action in any situation. When
human rights protection is the predominant motive, humanita-
rian intervention should be legal. Viewed in this light, the le-
gality of humanitarian intervention is supported by state prac-
tice when considering the Congo case,20 4 the India case,20 5 the
Tanzania case, 20 6 and most recently, the French intervention in
the former Yugoslavia supporting U.N. relief workers and sup-
plies.20 7
Realities of modem warfare also dictate that potential in-
tervenors can conduct an intervention with significantly re-
duced cost to both parties. 20 8 "Surgical air strikes" and mod-
ern laser guided missiles,2 0 9 for example, dramatically reduce
203. See generally id.; see S.C. Res. 688, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 858 (1991) (resolu-
tion of Apr. 5, 1991).
204. See supra note 154 (describing human rights abuses which transpired in the
Congo and military intervention which followed).
205. See supra notes 69-92 and accompanying text (explaining background of
India case); see also supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text (discussing proffered
reasons of how India case supports legality of humanitarian intervention).
206. See supra notes 121-27 and accompanying text (describing human rights
abuses which transpired in Uganda and Tanzanian military intervention which fol-
lowed).
207. See supra note 153 (discussing French use of military force in former Yugo-
slavia to support U.N. humanitarian relief efforts).
208. See, e.g., William J. Perry, Desert Storm and Deterrence, 70 FOREIGN AFF. 66
(1991). While there are limitations to new technological systems, they are effective in
reducing casualties to both sides.
Laser-guided bombs, laser-guided missiles and infrared-guided missiles
were dramatically more effective and cause far fewer civilian casualties than
the area bombing that characterized previous wars .... [T]hese [technolog-
ical] systems made a vital contribution to shortening the war, to dramatically
reducing coalition casualties and to reducing Iraqi civilian casualties.
Id. at 76. However, a former Naval pilot observed, on the effectiveness of surgical
air-strikes, that "surgical strikes exist only in think-tanks and mental institutions."
R.W. Apple, Jr., Confrontation in the Gut(- As Forces in Gulf Build, U.S. Weighs Its Options,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1990, at A9.
209. See, e.g., T.A. Heppenheimer, The Pentagon's 50th . . . and the Future For
America's Defense, FORBES,July 6, 1992, (Special Report), at 1 (outlining array of weap-
ons used in the U.S.-led war against Iraq: the Stealth fighter, laser-guided bombs,
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the cost in human life to the intervening state and the target
state, so that the risk of massive casualties can be minimized.21 °
In the past, these weapons were unavailable and the risk of
massive casualties to the intervening state deterred it from act-
ing. Thus, simply because humanitarian intervention was not
exercised in many situations that warranted action in the past
does not mean future interventions are not justifiable.2 1
C. Criteria for Intervening States to Follow
In legalizing humanitarian intervention, the international
community should follow certain criteria in a two-part inquiry.
The first level consists of two absolute prerequisites. First, a
state should use military force unilaterally only when verifia-
ble2 12 and extreme 213 human rights abuses exist that "shock
the conscience. 2 1 4 Only when human rights abuses are ex-
treme is humanitarian intervention completely justifiable and
beyond moral debate.215 Second, this use of force should only
occur when the international organizations fail'to fully address
and prevent the extreme abuses. 6 Collective action by the
international community is inherently legitimate and always
and the Tomahawk Cruise missile), The Tomahawk "carried electronic maps within
its on-board computer, permitting it to navigate through Baghdad's streets like a
tourist." Id.
210. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
211. Franck & Rodley, supra note 5, at 275.
212. Moore, supra note 162, at 264. Professor Moore proffers that the immedi-
ate full reporting to the Security Council is one criterion for humanitarian interven-
tion. Presumably, this reporting must include the reasons for the intervention, i.e.
the human rights violations, and thus, the human rights violations must have been
verifiable.
213. Lillich, Self-Help, supra note 12, at 348. "Forcible self-help ... is permissi-
ble only when a substantial deprivation of human rights values has occurred or is
threatened." Id.; Fonteyne, supra note 12, at 259-60.
214. OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, at 312.
215. Cf Wright, supra note 12, at 462. Professor Wright finds possible justifica-
tion for intervening on behalf of even one individual. Id. The justification derives
from the analogy that the modern day equivalent of Mahatma Gandhi might be
threatened with execution on a transparently false charge and that a "surgical" air
strike could prevent the execution. Id. This approach is somewhat akin to the
scheme proffered herein, but seems to ignore the current reality that absolute verifi-
cation and the possibility of prevention on behalf of one person is extremely difficult.
However, the scheme proffered herein provides for such an intervention on behalf of
a small number of people, if the human rights violation is completely verifiable and
the military intervention is limited to the task of preventing the violation.
216. Fonteyne, supra note 12, at 264.
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preferable to individual action.2 t7
The second level consists of supplemental caveats which
do not have to be followed completely, but lend credibility to
an intervention's legitimacy. These caveats are probative of
the altruistic nature of the intervention. These caveats include
a preference for multilateralism, 1 8 a minimum use of force
commensurate with preventing abuses, 219 a relative disinter-
estedness by the intervenor in the affairs of the target state,22 °
and an exhaustion of peaceful measures to prevent the
abuses.22  Because it is impossible to apply these caveats to
every scenario, these caveats should not become absolute pre-
requisites.2 2
1. The First Level: Absolute Prerequisites
The two first-level prerequisites must be followed. As ver-
ification of human rights abuses is the key to preventing disin-
genuous interventions, an intervening state may intervene only
when the abuse is extreme.2 The more widespread the
abuse, the easier it is to document and confirm its existence. 24
217. See id.
218. See id. at 264-65; Bazylar, supra note 12, at 602-04.
219. See Lillich, Self-Help, supra note 12, at 349; Fonteyne, supra note 12, at 262-
64; Bazylar, supra note 12, at 604-06.
220. See Lillich, Self-Help, supra note 12, at 350-51; Fonteyne, supra note 12, at
261; Bazylar, supra note 12, at 601-02; see also Farooq Hassan, Realpolitik in Interna-
tional Law: After Tanzanian- Ugandan Conflict "Humanitarian Intervention" Reexamined, 17
WILLAMETrE L. REV. 859, 897 (1981). Professor Hassan agrees with those who have
stated that the necessity for complete indifference before allowing humanitarian in-
tervention is naive and absurd, and concludes that "if the predominant motive for the
aggression is humanitarian, a limited degree of national interest should not conclu-
sively preclude its validity." Id.
221. See Fonteyne, supra note 12, at 264; Bazylar, supra note 12, at 606-07. But
see Wright, supra note 12, at 455-56 (arguing that exhaustion requirement could lead
to morally unjustifiable delay).
222. Wright, supra note 12, at 462. In discussing whether a limitation forcing a
state to attempt to exhaust all other remedies outside of military force before human-
itarian intervention is legitimate, Professor Wright concludes that this might lead to a
morally unjustifiable delay. Id. at 456. States would be slowed by their attempts to
create a diplomatic record of their actions taken before intervening simply to comply
with the rule, and this might cost many lives. Id.
223. See supra notes 213-15 (discussing ability to verify human rights abuses and
moral dilemma when human rights violation is only toward few individuals).
224. Moore, supra note 162, at 264. Professor Moore argues that past state
practice dictates that humanitarian interventions have occurred when the human
rights abuses were widespread. Id. Thus, only when human rights violations are ex-
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The lives or well-being of a large number of people must be
threatened before a state can justifiably use unilateral military
force. 25 No absolute limit or number can designate a line of
demarcation at which the use of force is justifiable, but the
limit should be proportionate to the nature and extent of the
human rights abuses. 26 Although the definition of "extreme"
is admittedly fluid, attempting to define each and every exam-
ple of human rights violation and the appropriate response to
each is practically impossible.2 " When confirmation of human
rights atrocities is available to a greater extent, the legality of
humanitarian intervention should be reconsidered and reap-
plied to meet the changing environment.
In addition, only where the human rights abuses are not
morally debatable should humanitarian intervention be em-
ployed. 228 For example, a state that opposes the death penalty
should not be permitted to use force against the United States,
where the death penalty is legal in some jurisdictions, before a
state-sponsored execution takes place. A state which opposes
abortion should not be permitted to use force against a state
which permits abortion. Such morally debatable issues should
be excluded from the bases upon which a state may use hu-
manitarian intervention to justify recourse to military force.
2. The Second Level: Useful Caveats
The second level consists of supplementary caveats which
lend credibility to the legitimacy of an intervention, but need
not be followed completely. Rather, they should be loose
guidelines for action by a potential intervenor. These caveats
include a preference for multilateralism,2 2 9 a minimum use of
treme can they be documented, and in such cases humanitarian intervention is legiti-
mate. Id.
225. Lillich, Self-Help, supra note 12, at 348.
226. Id. at 348-49.
227. See id. at 349. Speaking of the inability to set forth steadfast rules regarding
the proper response to human rights violations and the preference for a general stan-
dard, Professor Lillich stated that "[viague as this approach may sound, it is far pref-
erable to an a priori attempt to catalogue those rights to be protected and those
rights to be left unprotected by the sanction of self-help." Id.
228. See supra note 215 and accompanying text (setting forth Professor Wright's
discussion of morally justifiable intervention).
229. See infra notes 234-237 and accompanying text (discussing multilateralism
requirement).
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force commensurate with preventing abuses, 23 1 a relative dis-
interestedness of the intervenor in the affairs of the target
state,"' and an exhaustion of peaceful measures to prevent the
abuses.23 The caveats are important because they are proba-
tive of the altruistic nature of the intervention. These caveats
should not be prerequisites, though, as they are often difficult
to apply to discrete situations. The cost of not acting or of
reacting too slowly in order to comply with rules which may
not fit the present crisis is too high.23 3
A preference for multilateralism is encouraged. 4 While
collective action does not legitimize the action, 3 5 seeking the
cooperation of other states in the face of inaction by the
United Nations or other regional organizations lends credibil-
ity to a claim of intervention based largely on altruistic mo-
tives.23 6 When other states apart from the intervenor agree
with the use of force, such collective action is probative of the
action's genuine character.23 ' Because the preference for mul-
tilateralism could lead allies to join together against a common
enemy, such an action is probative of a political maneuver, and
would be recognized as disingenuous. Multilateralism,
although not dispositive of justifiable action, is persuasive.
The intervenor should be required to use the minimum
force necessary to achieve its goal, 238 and to use force propor-
tionate to the seriousness of the abuses. However, this caveat
should not be absolute. Using hindsight to gauge the possible
alternatives to various decisions concerning the use of force is
too divorced from the conditions under which the decisions
230. See infra notes 238-241 and accompanying text (discussing minimum use of
force requirement).
231. See supra note 220 and infra notes 241-245 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing relative disinterest requirement).
232. See infra notes 246-250 and accompanying text (discussing exhaustion of
peaceful measures requirement).
233. See supra note 215 and accompanying text (discussing why delay before in-
tervening is morally unjustifiable).
234. See Fonteyne, supra note 12, at 264-65; Bazylar, supra note 12, at 602-04.
235. Quincy Wright, The Legality of Intervention Under the United Nations Charter, 51
AM. SoC'Y INr'L L. PROCEEDINGS 79, 85 (1957). "Intervention does not gain in legal-
ity under customary international law by being collective rather than individual." Id.
236. See Lillich, Self-Help, supra note 12, at 333.
237. Bazylar, supra note 12, at 602-04.
238. See Fonteyne, supra note 12, at 262-64; Levitin, supra note 12, at 652-53;
Moore, supra note 162, at 264.
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were made.239 An altruistic intervenor obviously would desire
to use the least amount of force necessary to achieve its objec-
tive. Furthermore, if the intervening state uses patently exces-
sive force to prevent the human rights abuses, its motives are
questionable.2 4° Likewise, motives are also questionable when
the intervenor maintains a presence in the target state longer
than necessary to fulfill its humanitarian goal.2 4 '
Humanitarian motives that predominate over other mo-
tives are probative of an altruistic humanitarian interven-
tion.2 4 2 An absolute disinterestedness requirement, by which a
state must have no political, economic, or strategic motive for
the intervention, is impractical. 43 A state will inevitably have
motives apart from humanitarian motives for intervening.2 44
The real question is whether the humanitarian motives
predominate over other self-interested, political motives.
When the humanitarian motives predominate, they outweigh
other motives due to the importance of preventing large scale
human rights atrocities. 45
Legalization of humanitarian intervention should not re-
quire the intervenor to exhaust all peaceful means to prevent
abuse before acting,2 46 but the steps an intervening state does
employ before using force is probative of the legality of the
intervention. A true humanitarian intervention, under the
scheme proffered herein, would occur only after all peaceful
means are exhausted.24 7 The high cost of military force and its
239. Cf Fonteyne, supra note 12, at 262-64.
240. Bazylar, supra note 12, at 604. The use of too much force leading to the
conclusion that the intervention is pretextual takes two forms: when the number of
troops or armaments used to complete the objective is too high, or the troops remain
in the target state after completing the humanitarian mission. See id.
241. Id.
242. Lillich, Self-Help, supra note 12, at 350 ("The presence of [other] such mo-
tives does not invalidate the resort to forcible self-help if the overriding motive is the
protection of human rights."); Wright, supra note 12, at 460 ("To insist on purity of
motive is, realistically, to essentially abolish the legal doctrine of humanitarian inter-
vention.").
243. See supra note 220.
244. Bazylar, supra note 12, at 601-02. "In practice, purity of motive is probably
impossible; states rarely will intervene unless they have other interests in addition to
the humanitarian interest." Id.
245. Lillich, Self-Help, supra note 12, at 237.
246. See supra note 222 (setting forth Professor Wright's discussion of morally
unjustifiable delay before intervening).
247. Wright, supra note 12, at 456.
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unexpected consequences may cause a potential intervenor
with humanitarian motives to exhaust peaceful means before
using force.248 These peaceful means include, for example,
petitioning the U.N. Security Council for action, attempting to
enlist the support of other states, and attempting to meet di-
rectly with the abusing state.2 49 Furthermore, if a country fails
to employ other peaceful alternatives before engaging in the
use of force, the action may be a disingenuous invocation of
humanitarian intervention. A state with altruistic motives,
however, would be exonerated if it acted hastily in the face of
impending danger. Thus, because this condition is not an ab-
solute prerequisite, but rather simply probative of the altruistic
character of the use of force, a state would not delay its use of
force to satisfy this condition. 5 ° If a state needed to act
quickly, it could do so under the scheme proffered herein.
CONCLUSION
The costs in human suffering throughout the world out-
weigh the benefits of the illegality of humanitarian interven-
tion. The previous legality of humanitarian intervention
should be revisited. Collective security mechanisms that were
supposed to render humanitarian intervention obsolete have
never functioned, and may never function, properly. These
mechanisms therefore fail to prevent the occurrence of egre-
gious human rights violations. The fear of potential abuse of
the doctrine, while at one time legitimate, should no longer be
the overriding concern in international law because modern
technology enables states to detect pretextual invocations of
the doctrine. The legality of humanitarian intervention under
this scheme will not create incentives for the use of military
force by governments which were previously deterred from us-
ing force by humanitarian intervention's illegality. Legalizing
humanitarian intervention within certain limits strikes an effec-
248. Id.




tive balance between legitimate state sovereignty and the pro-
tection of human rights.
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